On Cavendish’s Perception
Lai, Wen
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ABSTRACT:
Even though Canvendish’s theory of perception can pass the test of perceptual presence and perceptual constancy to show that it is a theory with explanatory power, however, there is a problem within the theory which I call the demarcation problem. Considering the epistemological stance of Cavendish’s theory, it is a version of ‘Indirect Realism’. Yet this stance will give rise to the demarcation problem, which means that we cannot tell the difference between self-knowledge of our body and perception through her theory. In reality, these two kinds of experiences are qualitatively different and of different objects. I argue that the problem can be resolved by manifesting that perception involves causal processes while self-knowledge of our body does not. Finally, I intend to extend her theory to better understand the workings of perception. Self-knowledge of our body is the foundation of projecting the perceptual field and we perceive the external world as perceiving a bigger me.
Keywords: Margaret Cavendish, Perception, Perceptual presence, Perceptual constancy, Indirect Realism